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NOTES & COMMENTS
A Three-Ring Circus:
The Exploitation of Civil RICO, How
Treble Damages Caused It, and
Whether Rule 11 Can Remedy The
Abuse
Nicholas L. Nybo∗
INTRODUCTION

My personal interest in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”) began upon reading John Kroger’s
Convictions: A Prosecutor’s Battles Against Mafia Killers, Drug
Kingpins, and Enron Thieves. 1
Kroger, the former Oregon
∗ Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2013;
Bryant University, 2010. To my mother and father, the opportunities that I
have had are, without exception, a product of your hard work and love. To
my sister, Emily, our constant differences of opinion have always kept my
conceded (and conceited) stubbornness from metastasizing into full-fledged
ignorance. A special thanks to Professor Colleen Brown for both her
assistance on this Comment, as well as her guidance in the creation of this
legal writer. Credit for the title belongs to Tom Pagliarini. Finally, thanks to
all of the editors on the Roger Williams Law Review for their substantive
recommendations and dogged efforts in editing this Comment. All mistakes
and opinions (legitimate or otherwise) belong to the author.
1. JOHN KROGER, CONVICTIONS: A PROSECUTOR’S BATTLES AGAINST MAFIA
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Attorney General 2 and a former federal prosecutor in the Eastern
District of New York, 3 provides a detailed account of both the
innate difficulties in prosecuting organized criminals as well as
the specific ways in which RICO combats those difficulties. 4
While used sparingly at first, Kroger documents how, once
familiar with its provisions, federal prosecutors employed RICO to
fervently attack the sources of the mafia’s power and elusiveness.5
My initial reaction to the account was one of great reverence for
both RICO’s efficacy and Congress’s acumen in creating such an
effective tool. Then I found out about the circus.
In 2010, Feld Entertainment, Inc. (“Feld”), the corporation
that owns Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey’s circus
(“Ringling Bros.”), filed a civil complaint against a group of animal
activist organizations in D.C. District Court alleging that these
groups, along with their attorneys and other parties, had acted as
an organized crime syndicate in filing and prosecuting a
fraudulent Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) claim, which charged
Feld with abusing its Asian elephants. 6 While the details of the
fraud that the activist groups perpetrated upon both Feld and the
courts are certainly shocking, more alarming is Feld’s gross
exploitation of RICO, a powerful tool designed to rid our country of
organized crime, to earn a quick buck.7 Unfortunately, as
statistics below will indicate, Feld’s abuse of RICO is not an
isolated incident. 8
KILLERS, DRUG KINGPINS, AND ENRON THIEVES (2008) [hereinafter KROGER,
CONVICTIONS].
2. OREGON DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.doj.state.or.us/ (last visited
Aug. 30, 2012).
3. KROGER, CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 41.
4. See id. at 127-233.
5. See id. at 210-216.
6. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 7-14, Feld Entertainment,
Inc. v. ASPCA, No. 1:07-01532-EGS (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Feld
Complaint].
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) permits a private plaintiff to sue others for
RICO violations which cause injury to plaintiff’s business or property and
includes a treble damages provision allowing for the recovery of “threefold
the damages [plaintiff] sustains and the cost of the suit.”
8. Throughout this Comment, the discussion may, in certain
circumstances, paint Feld as the antagonist given their alleged abuse of the
RICO statute. It’s important to recognize, at the outset, that Feld is indeed a
victim of an extensive fraud and deserves to be compensated for its injuries.
RICO, however, is not the appropriate remedy.
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This Comment will explore how the civil RICO statute is
being exploited, with a particular focus on the Feld litigation, and
the potential solutions available to curb this exploitation. It
would be difficult to engage in a discussion of the misuse of a
particular statute without a cursory understanding of its
background and, therefore, Part I will engage in a brief overview
of the history and legislative purpose of RICO. Part II will explore
the empirical data indicating that RICO has sustained, and
continues to sustain, widespread abuse. Part III will outline the
facts of the Feld litigation as just one example of how plaintiffs,
with eyes on their wallets and not on the law, have exploited this
statute. Finally, Part IV will explore possible remedies with a
particular focus on the efficacy of relying on Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as a modest, yet effective, deterrent.
Ultimately, this Comment will advocate for federal courts to
actively employ their broad discretion under Rule 11 to sanction
RICO abusers in an effort to reserve this important cause of action
for legitimate claimants. While this remedy is certainly not
without its limitations, as detailed in Part (IV)(B)(1)-(4), the Rule
has certain features that render it an effective tool.
I.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF RICO

During the mid 20th century, the American mafia posed one of
the most pressing problems facing the United States criminal
justice system. 9 Its power and success stemmed, in part, from its
9. KROGER, CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 210 (“If you made a list of
serious crime issues in the United States back in 1975, the mafia would have
headed the list.”); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588 (1981)
(“Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains
billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the
illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major
portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as
syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the
importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and
other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly
used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to
subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; [and] (4) organized crime
activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic
system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with
free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten
the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and
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creative organizational structure, 10 as well as the federal
government’s relative lack of jurisdiction over many of the crimes
In response to these
committed by these organizations.11
problems, Congress passed RICO in 1970. 12 The Act includes 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d), 13 enumerating prohibited conduct, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(a), giving the government certain civil remedies to thwart
ongoing RICO violations, 14 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), creating a
its citizens.”).
10. Former Assistant United States Attorney and current New York
federal district court judge John Gleeson has observed that:
One characteristic of organized crime is that the most culpable and
dangerous individuals rarely do the dirty work. Although the
organization’s leaders are ultimately responsible for its crimes, they
typically deal through intermediaries and limit their own
participation to
behind-the-scenes control and guidance.
Consequently, their guilt usually cannot be proved by the testimony
of victims or eyewitnesses or by forensic evidence. And they never
confess.
KROGER, CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 214.
11. “Congress can criminalize conduct only if it affects interstate
commerce or some other clear federal interest. Everything else . . . must be
left to the fifty states. . . . Because of this traditional limit, many of the most
important crimes committed by the mafia were not violations of federal law . .
.” Id. at 213. Commentators have also suggested that for a long period of
time the Federal Bureau of Investigation actively avoided investigating the
American mafia. Id. at 140. Theories posited for why the FBI steered clear of
organized crime have been formulated as follows:
Some believe that [J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI from 19241972] was being blackmailed by mobsters who knew about his
(supposed) homosexuality. Other scholars believe that Hoover did
not regard organized crime as a national problem [or he] feared that
FBI agents would be corrupted if they became involved in
investigating the vice crimes that the mafia was engaged in
(gambling, drugs, and so on) . . . Still other scholars emphasize that
Hoover did not want to divert resources away from investigating
communists and political subversives.
Id. at 140-41 (quoting JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS 10-11
(2006)).
12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) criminalizes the receipt of income derived from a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. §
1962(b) criminalizes the investment of income, derived from racketeering
activity, into a legitimate business. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) criminalizes the
association with an enterprise engaged directly or indirectly in a pattern of
racketeering activity. Finally, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) criminalizes conspiracy to
commit any of the conduct prohibited under § 1962(a)-(c). 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(2006).
14. In 1982, a federal court judge invoked § 1964(a) to oust mob
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private cause of action.
Section 1964(c), the primary focus of this Comment, creates a
cause of action for private plaintiffs who can prove that they have
suffered an injury to their business or property as a result of
conduct prohibited under Section 1962(a)-(d). 15 RICO provides for
this private civil remedy to afford protection to “the honest
businessman who [is] damaged by unfair competition from the
racketeer businessman.” 16 Congress intended the civil remedy to
strengthen the impact of RICO as “an effective deterrent to
further expansion of organized crime’s economic power.” 17
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
civil RICO statute as a congressional effort to empower citizens to
act as “‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem
for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed
inadequate.” 18
Regardless of the specific phrasing, Congress’s goal was clear:
to protect society and the economy from the ill effects of organized
crime. While Congress’s aim in passing RICO was certainly
commendable and RICO has been a successful tool in alleviating
this country’s organized crime problem, 19 statistics suggest that
leadership from the Teamsters Local 560, a union of more than 35,000
members, and appointed a trustee to control the union. KROGER,
CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 215.
15. Specifically, § 1964(c) provides that:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any
conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or
sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The
exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an
action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection
with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to
run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
16. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 473 (2006) (citations
omitted).
17. 116 CONG. REC. 36296 (1970).
18. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 151 (1987).
19. It has been estimated that the American mafia currently possesses
less than five percent of the power that they wielded in the late 1970’s which
spurred Kroger to note that “[i]n contemporary America the most influential
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the civil statute has sustained, and continues to sustain, abuse
from private plaintiffs and their attorneys, who are enchanted by
the statutory provision allowing for recovery of treble damages20
and attorney’s fees. 21
II. THE SMOKING GUN: STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF ABUSE

One would imagine—because a civil RICO cause of action
requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant has
committed a serious federal crime—that the percent of criminal
RICO prosecutions would be at least relatively proportional to
civil litigation. 22 One would be wrong. Between 2001 and 2006,
there was an average of 759 civil RICO claims filed per year,23
while, in those same years, a paltry average of 212 criminal RICO
cases were referred to the United States Attorney’s Office.24
mafia family is not the Colombos or the Gambinos; it is the Sopranos. The
mafia is no longer a public threat. It has become a cultural artifact.” KROGER,
CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 210.
20. Treble damages are “[d]amages that, by statute, are three times the
amount of actual damages that the fact-finder determines is owed.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 449 (9th ed. 2009).
21. Treble damages and attorney’s fees are not the only incentives for
plaintiffs to file RICO suits. RICO also provides for more liberal venue and
service of process. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) authorizes that:
In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district court
of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice
require that other parties residing in any other district be brought
before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned,
and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of
the United States by the marshal thereof.
18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (2006).
22. Certainly, a modicum of disparity would naturally arise given the
heightened “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof required for a
criminal prosecution as opposed to the “preponderance of the evidence”
burden in civil suits.
23. Caroline A. Mitchell, Jordan Cunningham & Mark R. Lentz,
Returning RICO to Racketeers: Corporations Cannot Constitute an
Associated-in-Fact Enterprise Under 18 U.S.C. §1961(4), 13(1) FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 3 (2008).
24. See KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40525, ORGANIZED
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: TRENDS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15 (2010).
This average only indicates the number of cases that were referred to the
United States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) for prosecution by federal agencies.
Presumably, the number of cases that were actually prosecuted would be
even lower than this average, given that the USAO likely does not prosecute
each case referred to it, however the average cases actually prosecuted were
not provided in the report.
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Furthermore, a 2002 study found that, of the 185 RICO cases
decided by federal appellate courts between 1999 and 2001, 145
cases (seventy-eight percent) were civil and only 40 were
criminal. 25 These statistics indicate that civil litigants are filing
RICO lawsuits based on conduct that federal prosecutors have
little to no interest in thwarting. On the other hand, these results
may have been precisely what Congress had in mind, recognizing
that the Department of Justice has limited resources and,
therefore, encouraging private plaintiffs to step in when federal
resources are inadequate. 26
The more alarming statistic, however, is that, of the civil
RICO cases filed between 1999 and 2001, approximately seventy
percent resulted in dismissals or successful summary judgment
motions by defendants (later affirmed on appeal). 27 In fact, of the
145 civil RICO cases, only three (two percent of the total)
culminated in a final victory for the plaintiffs. 28 This data would
suggest that the recent disparity between civil and criminal RICO
cases is not a product of the legitimate differences in financial
resources or the varying burdens of proof, but rather is a function
of private plaintiffs filing frivolous claims that falter before a jury
is impaneled.
The abuse that these numbers reflect is not a new discovery.
This realization began as early as 1985, when Supreme Court
Justice Byron White cited an American Bar Association Task
Force study which “found that of the 270 known civil RICO cases
at the trial court level, 40% involved securities fraud, 37%
common-law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only
9% ‘allegations of criminal activity of a type generally associated
with professional criminals.’” 29
These statistical imbalances
prompted Justice White to observe that “[i]nstead of being used
25. Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 22 & n.111
(2002) [hereinafter Private Justice].
26. Recall the Supreme Court’s observation in 1987 that one of the
purposes of the RICO civil provision is to encourage private citizens to help
combat “a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources
are deemed inadequate.” Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 151.
27. Private Justice, supra note 25, at 22.
28. Id.
29. Sedima v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 n.16 (1985) (citation
omitted). A second study found that, of 132 published civil RICO decisions,
95 involved either securities or contractual disputes. Id.
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against mobsters and organized criminals, [civil RICO had]
become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against ‘respected
and legitimate enterprises.’” 30
III. “THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH”: FELD ENTERTAINMENT, INC V.
ASPCA

Current civil RICO litigation between Feld Entertainment,
Inc. and a group of animal rights activists presents a perfect
illustration of the exploitation of civil RICO. The story behind this
litigation began in July of 2000 when the activist groups 31 and a
handful of former employees of Ringling Bros. circus, including
Thomas Rider, 32 filed suit against Feld Entertainment and
Ringling Bros., alleging that the circus had been physically
abusing its Asian elephants in violation of the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”). 33 The D.C. District Court dismissed the case for lack
of standing,34 but the circuit court reversed after finding that
standing for the suit was based upon Rider’s alleged “aesthetic
injuries” suffered while witnessing the prolonged abuse of
elephants that Rider had cared for during his employment with
the circus.35
After the reversal, the animal rights groups dismissed their
original claim, but in 2003 re-filed the same claim in the same
court. 36 A bench trial began on February 4, 2009 and concluded
on March 18 when the district court judge ruled in favor of Feld
after finding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient
30. Id. at 499. (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. These groups included: the American Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, the Animal Welfare Institute, and the Fund for Animals.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, American Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey
Circus, No. 1:03CV02006 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2003).
32. Rider worked as an elephant “handler” for Ringling Bros. from June
1997 until November 1999. Id.
33. See id.
34. ASPCA v. Ringling Bros. & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 335 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). The court found that, at the dismissal stage, Rider had sufficiently
pled an “aesthetic injury” in witnessing the abuse to the elephants with
which he had formed a powerful bond. Id. at 337-38.
35. ASPCA v. Feld Enm't, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65-66 (D. D.C. 2009).
Rider claimed that his feelings for the elephants resembled the feeling he had
for his own children and grandchildren. Id. at 87.
36. Id. at 60.
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to establish that Rider had standing to sue. 37 The district court
found that Rider was “essentially a paid plaintiff and fact witness
who [was] not credible” 38 and that, therefore, the plaintiffs had
failed to establish standing. 39 The district court based its finding
on evidence that Rider had been compensated nearly $200,000 by
the activist groups and their lawyers, as well as the numerous
inconsistencies within Rider’s own testimony.40 This time, the
D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. 41
This adjudication has not, however, marked the end of
litigation between the circus and the activists. In February 2010,
Feld Entertainment filed suit against a group of defendants,
which included all of the plaintiffs from the earlier litigation as
well as additional activist groups 42 and the attorneys who
represented the groups in the original ESA litigation. 43 The
complaint alleges that these activists, their attorneys, and Rider
had engaged in a wide array of criminal conduct44 in an effort to
manufacture a lawsuit against Feld Entertainment. 45
The

37. Id. at 101.
38. Id. at 67.
39. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)
(establishing Article III standing requirements as follows: “[A] plaintiff must
show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3)
it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision”).
40. ASPCA, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 78, 83-89. The inconsistencies referenced
by the court in rejecting Rider’s testimony as not credible included, but were
not limited to, (1) Rider’s rejecting numerous opportunities to visit the
elephants he claimed to have such a close relationship with, (2) Rider’s
inability to identify the elephants by name on videotape, and (3) a videotape
of Rider calling one of the elephants a “bitch.” Id.
41. ASPCA v. Feld, Enm’t, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“As to .
. . standing, the district court disbelieved Rider and found, as a matter of law,
that Rider did not have the personal attachment he claimed and did not, as
he claimed, suffer from the elephants’ mistreatment. Nothing in these
findings reflects an erroneous application of our case law.”).
42. Feld’s complaint included as defendants the Animal Protection
Institute and the Wildlife Advocacy Project.
43. See generally, Feld Complaint, supra note 6.
44. The complaint alleged that the defendants had violated federal and
state laws prohibiting bribery, gratuity payments, mail fraud, wire fraud,
money laundering, and obstruction of justice. Id. at 102-128.
45. Id. at 1.
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plaintiff avers that the defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)46
and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), 47 given that the activist groups and their
lawyers had engaged in (and conspired to engage in) an eight-year
bribery scheme, which paid Rider nearly $200,000 for false
testimony to establish standing for the ESA lawsuit against
Feld.48 Furthermore, the plaintiff asserts that, throughout this
scheme, the defendants evaded taxes, provided false answers in
interrogatories and depositions, and laundered Rider’s bribe
money through false legal bills. 49 Feld requests treble damages
which have been estimated in the range of sixty million dollars,
calculated from their alleged twenty million dollars spent
defending the fraudulent ESA lawsuit. 50 Of course, this number
does not include the attorney’s fees to which Feld may be entitled
with respect to the legal costs incurred in prosecuting this RICO
suit. At the time of publication, the defendants had yet to file an
answer to the complaint or any motions to dismiss the complaint.
While this set of facts certainly presents an invidious scheme
by the activists to commit fraud, federal crime, and gross legal
malpractice, the question remains whether these overzealous
animal lovers and their attorneys are truly the kind of “organized
criminals” 51 that Congress envisioned punishing when it enacted
46. § 1962(c) prohibits “any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, [from] conduct[ing] or participat[ing], directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity
or collection of unlawful debt.”
47. § 1962(d) prohibits “any person [from] conspir[ing] to violate any of
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”
48. Feld Complaint, supra note 6, at 3.
49. Id.
50. HUMANEWATCH.ORG, http://humanewatch.org/index.php/site/post/rico
_update_was_hsus_involved_in_a_pay-to-play_racket/ (last visited Aug. 30,
2012).
51. Certainly, legitimate organized criminals engage in witness
tampering, however it tends to be a bit more violent than what Feld has
alleged:
Between 1975 and 1994 more than fifty-five people were murdered
in the [Charlestown, Massachusetts] neighborhood. According to
news reports, the police and Charlestown residents knew who
committed nearly all the murders, for there were often eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, no one in the community was willing to step forward
and testify against the killers, for Charlestown was ruled by the
Irish Mob, and it enforced a strict code of silence . . . In the United
States, roughly 60 percent of murders are eventually solved by the

NYBO DESKTOPPED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/9/2013 3:46 PM

A THREE RING CIRCUS

29

RICO in 1970.52 Or is Feld exploiting this federal statute—as
Justice Byron White opined in 1985 53—to transform a simple
fraud case into a sixty million dollar pay day?
IV. TAMING THE LION: POTENTIAL REMEDIES FOR THE ABUSE

Of course the easy response would be to blame Feld for its
greed and head to the movies next time the circus is in town.
However, Henry Ford, famous American industrialist and founder
of Ford Motor Company, once recommended: “Don’t find a fault.
Find a remedy.” 54 Given that Feld is certainly not alone in its
RICO misuse (as indicated by the data set forth in Part II) it
would seem prudent to follow Ford’s advice and attempt to
determine whether there exists a potential remedy for this
problem. The following discussion will break into three sections.
Section A will briefly examine three solutions that have been, in
one form or another, attempted but will ultimately (in this
author’s opinion) not solve the issue. Section B, on the other
hand, will introduce Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as a modest, yet potentially powerful tool in combating
RICO abuse. This Section will also closely scrutinize Rule 11’s
limitations as a deterrent. Finally, Section C will set forth an
ultimate recommendation regarding the manner in which federal
courts can begin to preserve RICO for victims of true organized
crime.
A. What Remedies Have Been Tried?
The following three remedies have, with varying success, been
police. Because of the code of silence, that figure in Charlestown was
less than 25 percent.
KROGER, CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 22.
52. It is true that Congress intended RICO to reach legitimate
businesses that had strayed from their path of noncriminal activity into
certain criminal conduct. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)
(“Congress wanted to reach both ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ enterprises.
The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor
immunity from its consequences.”). However, Congress had no intent to
punish “isolated offenders.” Id. at 496 n.14 (“The target of RICO is thus not
sporadic activity. . . . RICO [is] ‘not aimed at the isolated offender.’”).
53. Id. at 499.
54. Director, Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation v. BMC Mfg.,
Inc., 504 N.W.2d 695, 699 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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attempted to curb RICO misuse: self-policing, narrow statutory
construction, and alternate formulations of RICO legislation. The
United States Attorney’s Office utilizes (with great success) RICO
self-policing, numerous federal courts have (with little success)
attempted to narrowly construe certain provisions of RICO, and
many states (with undetermined success) have passed RICO
legislation far more modest than their federal counterpart.
Unfortunately, these solutions, for a variety of reasons, will likely
not be effective in solving this issue on the federal civil level.
1.

Self-Policing

One laissez faire solution to the exploitation of RICO would be
simply to encourage more self-policing. Generally speaking, self
regulation in the legal profession has sustained heavy criticism:
“Due to an inherent conflict of interest, lawyers cannot be
expected to regulate their own members effectively.” 55 In the
criminal RICO context, the United States Attorney’s Office has
successfully regulated itself by requiring that federal prosecutors
receive formal approval from the Criminal Division prior to filing
any RICO charges. 56 This system of self-policing is effective in
criminal prosecutions given the immense financial burden that
RICO prosecutions impose on the government 57 coupled, of course,
with the absence of any treble damages temptations. There are,
however, certain benefits that federal prosecutors derive from
55. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law
Professors, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2583, 2598 (1996) (touting legal malpractice
lawsuits as the most effective manner in which to regulate the practice of
law).
56. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9110.101 (1997) available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_ reading_
roo m/usam/title9/110mcrm.htm#9-110.101 (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) (“No
RICO criminal indictment or information or civil complaint shall be filed, and
no civil investigative demand shall be issued, without the prior approval of
the Criminal Division.”). The Manual further states that “it is the policy of
the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used. It is the
purpose of these guidelines to make it clear that not every proposed RICO
charge that meets the technical requirements of a RICO violation will be
approved.” Id. at § 9-110.200.
57. “Mafia investigations are [ ] prohibitively expensive. . . . [Y]ou
cannot bring the mob to justice unless you are willing to devote a significant
amount of time and money to sophisticated, long-term, proactive
investigations that may, in the end, fail to reach any conclusive results.”
KROGER, CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 139-140.
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filing RICO charges such as “prejudicial spillover,” 58 a product of
the more permissive joinder rules in RICO prosecutions.59
Nevertheless, these tactical advantages pale in comparison to the
“pot of treble damages gold” at the end of the civil RICO rainbow.
2.

Narrow Judicial Construction

A second approach would be for district courts to construe the
provisions of RICO more narrowly in an attempt to ensure that
RICO is used legitimately against actual criminal organizations.60
58. Kroger described “prejudicial spillover” as follows:
In any criminal investigation against multiple targets, your proof is
inevitably going to be strong against some defendants and weak
against others. If you have to try each defendant separately, you
win the strong cases and lose the weak ones. If, however, you can
put together all the defendants in one trial, the jury will have a
tough time keeping the defendants and evidence clear and separate
in their minds. Over the length of the trial, the strong proof against
some defendants will “spill over” and “infect” the defendants against
whom your evidence is weak, and this gives you a very good chance
of running the table—of convicting the whole bunch.
Id. at 216.
59. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only allow prosecutors to
join multiple defendants under the same indictment if “they are alleged to
have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts
or transactions.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b). Moreover, the Rules only allow
multiple offenses to be joined in one indictment when the offenses “are of the
same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are
connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” FED R. CRIM.
P. 8(a). However, if RICO is charged, then multiple (seemingly unrelated)
crimes or defendants can be joined as parts of the overarching enterprise.
Kroger recalled one such joinder: “In a case filed in 2000 against Colombo
boss Alphonse Persico and his underlings . . . I combined in one indictment
eleven defendants and a dozen different crimes: loan-sharking, money
laundering, three separate extortion schemes, illegal gambling, securities
fraud, telecommunications fraud, and marijuana and Ecstasy dealing.”
KROGER, CONVICTIONS, supra note 1, at 216.
60. An example of such narrow construction can be found in the Second
Circuit’s decision in Sedima v. Imrex, Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984). The
Second Circuit in Sedima interpreted the injury element of the civil statute
as requiring “that the plaintiff show injury different in kind from that
occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply caused by
the predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to
deter.” Id. at 496. This narrow interpretation of the injury element was
rejected by the Supreme Court which emphasized that “[t]he [circuit] court’s
statement that the plaintiff must seek redress for an injury caused by
conduct that RICO was designed to deter is unhelpfully tautological.” Sedima
v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 494 (1985).
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The flaw in that option is that such construction directly
contradicts the explicit mandate levied by two fairly prominent
institutions located in our nation’s capitol: Congress and the
Supreme Court. Congress, when passing RICO in 1970, specified
that “[t]he provisions of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.” 61 The Supreme Court reiterated
that a “less restrictive reading [of RICO] is amply supported by
our prior cases and the general principles surrounding this
statute. RICO is to be read broadly.” 62 Moreover, the Court in
Sedima v. Imrex, Co. elaborated that a liberal construction of
RICO is even more appropriate in civil suits than it is in criminal
prosecutions.63
While a narrow construction may be most
attractive, it would seemingly require congressional approval.
3.

Repeal

A third, more draconian solution may be to simply repeal the
civil RICO statute or, at the very least, the treble damages
provision contained therein. Currently, thirty-six states (and
Puerto Rico) have statutes criminalizing organized crime 64 and, of
61. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, ch. 96, sec.
1961, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
62. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497; see also Bridge v. Pheonix Bond & Indem.
Co., 553 U.S. 639, 660 (2008) (“We have repeatedly refused to adopt
narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a
preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe.”).
63. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 (“The statute’s ‘remedial purposes’ are
nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action for those
injured by racketeering activity.”).
64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-74-104
(1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.3 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-104
(2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-395 (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
1503 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.03 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-4
(2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 842-2 (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18-7804 (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/4 (LexisNexis 2000); IND.
CODE. ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 706A.2 (West 1999);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.120 (LexisNexis 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:1353 (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.159i (West 2004); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.903 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-5 (West 1999); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-1355 (2009) http://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes;
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.400 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2011) (effective
October 1, 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-2 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-42-4 (2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.20 (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
75D-4 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-02 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2923.32(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (effective Sept. 30, 2011); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, § 1403 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.720 (West 2011); 18 PA.
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those thirty-seven jurisdictions, only twenty-one specifically
provide for a private cause of action under that statute.65
Moreover, several of the states that do provide for a civil RICO
cause of action, have eschewed the treble damages provision in
favor of more modest damage calculations. 66 While not all of the
states are models of RICO restraint, 67 these state statutes do
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911(b) (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-2 (1999); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-12-204 (2006); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02 (West 2011);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-514
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.060 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
946.83 (West 2005); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 971b (2008).
65. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2314.04(A) (2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1817-106(7) (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1505(c) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. §
16-14-6(c) (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 842-8(c) (LexisNexis 2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-7805(A) (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 706A.3(7) (West 1999) LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1356(E) (2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-9(6) (West
1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.470 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:41-4(c) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-42-6(A) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
75D-8(c) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-05(1) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.34(F) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (effective July 1, 2007); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 166.725(7)(a) (West 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-4(c) (1999);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1605(1) (LexisNexis 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.82.100(1)(a) (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.87(4) (West 2005); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 971h(d) (2008).
66. Hawaii’s civil RICO statute decrees that “[a]ny person injured in the
person’s business or property by reason of a violation of this chapter may sue
therefor in any appropriate court and shall recover the damages the person
sustains and the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney’s fee.” HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 842-8(c) (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added). Similarly,
Washington’s damages provision states that “[a]n action for damages filed by
or on behalf of an injured person, the state, or the county shall be for the
recovery of damages and the costs of the suit, including reasonable
investigative and attorney’s fees.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.100(1)(c)
(West 2009) (emphasis added). Moreover, Utah’s civil RICO statute only
allows for double recovery: “A person injured in his person, business, or
property by a person engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of
Section 76-10-1603 may sue in an appropriate district court and recover twice
the damages he sustains.” UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1605(1) (LexisNexis 2008)
(emphasis added). Likewise, Wisconsin’s civil RICO statute provides: “Any
person who is injured by reason of any violation of § 946.83 or § 946.85 has a
cause of action for 2 times the actual damages sustained, and, when
appropriate, punitive damages.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.87(4) (West 2005)
(emphasis added). On the other hand, the Wisconsin statute allows punitive
damages to be recovered, as well, which may, depending on the
outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct, result in far greater awards than
treble damages could produce.
67. Mississippi has adopted a damage provision that allows RICO
plaintiffs to recover both treble damages as well as punitive damages. MISS.
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indicate that many legislatures have found it possible to combat
organized crime either without private civil statutes or without
the treble damages provisions.68
However, despite the aforementioned success that federal
RICO has had in reducing the threat that organized crime posed
three decades ago, there still remains many legitimate organized
crime threats to our country today which justify the need for
sweeping federal RICO statutes.
A 2010 report from the
Congressional Research Service stated that “[o]rganized crime
activities across the globe do not appear to be waning, and the
National Intelligence Council has estimated that by 2025, the
‘relative power’ of criminal networks will [have] rise[n], and some
countries could even be taken over and run by these networks.”69
While individual states may be capable of keeping organized crime
at bay without powerful civil remedies, the federal government
may not be so fortunate. Setting aside the clichéd “baby with the
bathwater” critique, repeal seems imprudent in the face of these
continuing organized crime threats.
And so the struggle for a solution continues. But perhaps
such close scrutiny of the history, purpose, and text of RICO has
led to a bit of myopia. There are, of course, general rules which
prohibit attorneys and their clients from abusing the law and
treating baseless lawsuits as lottery tickets. Given that the above
remedies are impractical, specifically prohibited, or otherwise
flawed, can Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve
CODE ANN. § 97-43-9(6) (West 1999) (“Any person who is injured by reason of
any violation of the provisions of this chapter shall have a cause of action
against any person or enterprise convicted of engaging in activity in violation
of this chapter for threefold the actual damages sustained and, when
appropriate, punitive damages.”).
Mississippi’s statute does, however,
require a criminal conviction for the cause of action to accrue. Id.
68. Notice that none of the three states with the cities most traditionally
associated with organized crime problems (Boston, New York City, and
Chicago) have private civil provisions. Massachusetts, in fact, currently has
no organized crime legislation and Illinois’s very narrow criminal statute only
implicates organized crime syndicates engaging in narcotics trafficking. 724
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/4 (LexisNexis 2000).
69. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 24, at 15. The report
by the Congressional Research Service found that serious organized crime
threats currently include Russian groups, such as the “Vory V Zakone,” Asian
groups, such as the Yakuza, “the Big Circle,” and the Fuk Ching, and human
smuggling rings in Albania (made popular by the 2008 major motion picture
Taken). Id. at 17-20.
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as an adequate remedy to thwart the problem of RICO
exploitation?
B. Deterrence under Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in part,
provides for the imposition of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
sanctions upon attorneys—and, on occasion, their clients—when
those attorneys file papers with the court which are not supported
by a reasonable inquiry 70 or otherwise lack merit. Specifically,
Rule 11(b) mandates that, by signing a court document, 71 an
attorney certifies that:
(1) [the document] is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument
for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4)
the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information. 72
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ attorneys who use RICO to scare
defendants into settling basic fraud cases or attempt tenuous
RICO “Hail Marys” with their sights set on treble damages may
70. Courts have adopted the Advisory Committee’s determination of
what amounts to a “reasonable inquiry:”
What constitutes reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as
how much time for investigation was available for the signer;
whether he had to rely on a client for information as to the facts
underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the
pleading, motion or other paper was based on a plausible view of the
law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another
member of the bar.
Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 659 (M.D.N.C.
1985) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes).
71. Rule 11(a) requires that every document filed with the court be
signed.
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(4).
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run afoul of Rule 11’s requirements.73 The Supreme Court has
recognized “that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless
filings in District Court.” 74 More specifically, the 1983 Advisory
Committee Notes recognize that the primary purpose of Rule 11 is
to “discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline
the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses.” 75
Rule 11 appears to be a perfect fit to help curb the misuse of
RICO and, in fact, some circuits have already used Rule 11 to
punish RICO litigants when their pleadings run astray of the
Rule’s standards. 76 More specifically, Rule 11(b)(1) and 11(b)(2)
seem the most helpful tools to deter plaintiffs from filing
73. Notably, these attorneys may also run afoul of the rules of
professional conduct. Specifically, the language of Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.1 is strikingly similar to that used in Rule 11: “A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which
includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1. However, there are a
few key differences between the functioning of the rules of professional
conduct and Rule 11:
Rule 3.1 and FRCP 11 articulate similar standards, but there are
important distinctions between them. . . . Violation of Rule 3.1 can
result in bar disciplinary action against an attorney. A violation of
FRCP 11 is punished not by the state bar but the judge in the civil
action, and it can result in nonmonetary directives or monetary
sanctions against a lawyer or a party. . . . FRCP 11 has a “safe
harbor” provision not found in Rule 3.1. If an opposing party makes
a motion complaining that a lawyer has violated FRCP 11, the
lawyer may withdraw the allegedly frivolous pleading within 21 days
after opposing counsel’s motion and suffer no sanction other than
having to pay the attorneys’ fees that the opposing party incurred for
making the motion.
LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 602-03 (2008) [hereinafter LERMAN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS].
74. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (U.S. 1990).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note.
76. See Brandt v. Shal Associates, 960 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1992)
(affirming nearly $450,000 in Rule 11 sanctions after the plaintiff’s attorney
had filed a civil RICO complaint which failed to allege any pattern of
racketeering or fraudulent conduct required to sustain a civil RICO charge);
see also Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming over $1
million in attorney’s fees and costs ordered by the district court after the
court found that the RICO plaintiffs had no evidence of proximate cause to
support their claim); see also O’Ferral v. Trebol Motors Corp., 45 F.3d 561
(1st Cir. 1995) (affirming nearly $12,000 in Rule 11 sanctions after plaintiffs
filed a trumped up RICO complaint based on a “garden variety consumer
deception” fact pattern).
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illegitimate RICO claims. 77 For instance, if Feld and its attorneys
are alleging RICO for the purposes of publicly embarrassing the
animal rights groups, scaring them into quick settlement, and/or
making a grab for treble damages without any legitimate legal
justification, Rule 11(b)(1) and (b)(2) would represent avenues of
viable recourse for both the defendants and the court.78
Unfortunately, Rule 11 is not without its own limitations.
Specifically, there are four idiosyncrasies within the language or
application of Rule 11 which, while certainly not fatal to its
ultimate effectiveness, will limit the efficacy of the Rule as a
deterrent against civil RICO misuse. 79
1.

Finding Refuge in a “Safe Harbor”

Rule 11 contains a “safe harbor” provision which requires
litigants, prior to filing a Rule 11 motion for sanctions with the
court, to present their opponents with the basis for the motion and
to allow the opponent a twenty-one-day period to withdraw or

77. For the most part, abuses of RICO do not stem from factual lies or
exaggerations by the plaintiffs, but rather from plaintiffs attempting to
stretch the RICO laws so that their facts fall within its purview. For
instance, Feld has not (to the author’s knowledge) made any false factual
statements or denials. The alleged malfeasance arises from their untenable
application of the law. Therefore, Rules (11)(b)(3) and 11(b)(4), which punish
parties for unsupported factual contentions, would not be the most helpful
tools to correct the misuse.
78. The irony of Rule 11 being discussed in the context of the Feld
Entertainment litigation is that the activists’ scheme was certainly
sanctionable under Rule 11. Of course, Rule 11 does not provide for treble
damages.
79. The following critiques focus on Rule 11’s specific application to
RICO. Rule 11 has been subject to other general critiques:
[S]ome asserted that the Rule has had a “chilling effect” on advocacy,
particularly on the ability of counsel to advance novel theories of
recovery or legal contentions. Others asserted that the Rule had a
disproportionate impact on plaintiffs’ counsel, particularly in civil
rights litigation.
Some commentators criticized the Rule as
generating a veritable “cottage industry” of sanctions practice,
spawning satellite litigation that was encouraged by the Rule’s
provision, which authorized litigants to recover attorneys’ fees for
pursuing sanctions motions. Others expressed concern that the Rule
reduced civility among counsel.
Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. REV.
1007, 1010 (1999) [hereinafter Second Look].
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otherwise cure the contested pleading. 80 The goal of the safe
harbor provision, added during the 1993 Amendments, has been
recognized as promoting a “civility among attorneys and between
bench and bar [that is] furthered by having attorneys
communicate with each other with an eye toward potentially
resolving their differences prior to court involvement.” 81 However,
this provision has also been animadverted as allowing “litigants to
be more cavalier about their fact investigations and legal research
because they [can] withdraw a challenged written representation
with impunity.” 82
Accordingly, the safe harbor provision could allow
surreptitious RICO plaintiffs to “test the waters” by filing a
fraudulent RICO complaint and waiting to see how the defendant
responds, knowing that they will always have the option of curing
the “error” later without incurring any liability. On the other
hand, there is evidence indicating that this provision has not had
such a harmful impact on the efficacy of Rule 11. In June 1995,
two years after the safe harbor provision had been enacted, the
Federal Judicial Center conducted a study revealing that, of the
148 federal judges surveyed, only thirty-nine percent responded
that the safe harbor provision had decreased the amount of Rule
11 filings.83 Moreover, the safe harbor provision only shields
litigants from motions made by opposing parties, and, therefore,
does not protect litigants against courts imposing sanctions sua
sponte and pursuant to Rule 11(c)(3). 84 Finally, while the safe
80. Specifically, Rule 11(c)(2) provides:
A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other
motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates
Rule 11(b). The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not
be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim,
defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately
corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the
court sets.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (emphasis added).
81. Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 294 (6th Cir. 1997).
82. Second Look, supra note 79, at 1023. “In 2005, the House of
Representatives approved H.R. 420, which would have eliminated the safe
harbor provision from FRCP 11 . . . The bill was not approved by the Senate
and did not become law.” LERMAN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 73, at 603
n.15.
83. JOHN SHAPARD, FED. JUD. CTR. REPORT OF A SURVEY CONCERNING
RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (1995).
84. Second Look, supra note 79, at 1021 (“[T]he safe harbor provision is a
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harbor provision hinders the Rule’s effectiveness in stopping
frivolous claims from being filed, the provision does not stop Rule
11 from serving the ultimate goal: extracting frivolous civil RICO
claims from the (already congested) judicial process. Whether
these claims are never filed in the first place or they are
withdrawn after being filed, Rule 11 will still ensure that they
never come before a jury.
2.

Rewarding the Guilty

A second concern, given the compensatory nature of Rule 11
sanctions, is whether defendants in RICO cases actually deserve
to be compensated. 85
Courts have recognized that, while
deterrence is certainly the primary purpose behind Rule 11
sanctions, the sanctions can also compensate the defendants
through the imposition of attorney’s fees. 86 However, in many
cases involving potential RICO abuse, the defendants (while not
as guilty as the plaintiffs allege) are far from innocent parties
deserving of compensation. By way of example, consider the
defendants in the Feld litigation; while they may not be
racketeers, they still dragged a federal court through almost nine
years of expensive litigation 87 based solely on perjured testimony
limited refuge for the alleged violator. Thus, although the amended Rule may
insulate an attorney from opposing counsel’s attack, the Rule will not
necessarily preclude the court from imposing sanctions.”). Rule 11(c)(3)
allows the court, on its own initiative, to require any party (regardless of
representation) to justify why a certain filing has not violated the provisions
of Rule 11(b)(1)-(4). Rule 11(c)(5)(B) allows the court to sanction the party
after the court has granted that party the opportunity to be heard on the
matter.
85. Rule 11(c)(4) allows courts to order “payment to the movant of part
or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting
from the violation.”
86. Brown v. Fed’n of State Medical Boards., 830 F.2d 1429, 1437 (7th
Cir. 1987) (“[O]ne of the goals of Rule 11 is to impose costs on the careless or
reckless lawyer. Compensation is one thrust of Rule 11.”).
87. U.S. District Judge Emmet Sullivan noted in his 2009 opinion
finding in favor of Feld:
To say that this case has involved highly litigious, complex, and
protracted discovery and motions practice is to profoundly
understate the history of this case. . . . Significant judicial resources
were expended, particularly during the more than five years of
discovery in this matter, in order to advance this litigation to trial.
ASPCA v. Feld, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 n.5 (D.D.C. 2009).
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for which they paid nearly $200,000. Does that conduct deserve to
be compensated? Should those defendants not be required to pay
their own attorney’s fees—per the “American Rule” 88—given that
they were the ones who started this entire litigation in 2000?
Feld is certainly not an isolated example; many civil RICO
cases involve defendants who have committed fraud,89 insider
trading,90 and a slew of other crimes, and to compensate their
malfeasance seems unfair. On the other hand, if the plaintiffs did
engage in a bad faith attempt 91 to exploit RICO, in an effort to
fraudulently obtain (among other things) attorney’s fees from the
defendants, then a logical (even symmetrical) punishment for that
bad faith attempt may in fact be attorney’s fees. Moreover, the
Advisory Committee addressed this concern, during the 1993
Amendments to Rule 11, when it stated that “since the purpose of
Rule 11 is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule provides
that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be
paid into the court as a penalty.” 92 Ultimately, the court, as
previously discussed, has very broad discretion in not only the
amount of sanctions but also to whom the sanctions are to be
paid 93 and, therefore, the compensation issue can be fairly easily
resolved by district courts requiring that the sanctions be paid to
the court and not to the defendants.

88. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975) (“In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled
to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”).
89. See Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2007)
(RICO claim based on insurance company’s discontinuing plaintiff’s
insurance benefits after plaintiff suffered a heart attack as part of a larger
scheme to reduce the company’s more expensive payouts).
90. See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Milken, 17 F.3d 608 (2d Cir.
1994) (RICO claim filed against Michael Milken and his brother Lowell
arising out of their, now infamous, insider trading scheme).
91. Notably, the bad faith exception to the American Rule regarding
attorney’s fees may apply in many scenarios where RICO has been abused by
the plaintiff. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean
Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561 n.6 (1986) (“[C]ourts traditionally have recognized
three other exceptions to the ‘American Rule’ . . . courts are empowered to
award fees against a losing party who has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note.
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (“The sanction may include . . . an order to
pay a penalty into court.”).
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Rule 11(c)(5)(A) and Problems with Deterrence

A third problem with attempting to use Rule 11 to control
RICO plaintiffs stems from Rule 11(c)(5)(A), which states in part
that “[t]he court must not impose a monetary sanction against a
represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2).” 94 Presumably, the
rationale behind Rule 11(c)(5)(A) is that parties’ legal arguments
are within the authority and expertise of their attorneys—this is
why they are hired—so any misconduct or negligence regarding
those legal arguments should fall solely upon the shoulders of
those attorneys. Since Rule 11(c)(5)(A) prohibits the actual
plaintiff from being financially punished by the courts for a Rule
11(b)(2) violation, it provides no deterrence for the clients not to
push the line between tenable and untenable RICO claims. Of
course, that party’s attorney is still subject to the Rule, but one
could easily imagine that an aggressive client, offering one-third of
its treble damages recovery (in Feld’s case, an estimated sixty
million dollars), may be awfully difficult to rebuff.
On the other hand, courts have recognized that “[a]n attorney
has a professional duty to dismiss a baseless motion or lawsuit,
even over client’s objection, and to do so promptly on learning that
the client’s position is without merit.” 95 If attorneys refuse to put
their reputation (and wallets) on the line for their client’s frivolous
legal claims then Rule 11 will remain an effective deterrent to
RICO abuse, regardless of the Rule 11(c)(5)(A) exception.96
Unfortunately, common experience suggests that there will
always be an attorney willing to take such risks for a wealthy
client. 97
4.

Rule 11(b)(2)’s “Warranted by Existing Law” Standard

Arguably the most troublesome problem in relying on Rule 11
to correct RICO exploitation arises out of the inherent difficulty of
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(5)(A). Recall that Rule 11(b)(2) prohibits the
submission of documents that set forth legal contentions which are
determined to be unwarranted by existing law or otherwise frivolous.
95. Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656, 661
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (emphasis added).
96. Note that Rule 11(c)(5)(A) shields only represented parties.
Accordingly, if a party moves forward pro se (possibly because no attorney
will take their case) the Rule will provide no shield for those parties.
97. This truism is, of course, not limited to the legal profession.
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judging Rule 11(b)(2) violations given the numerous legal
uncertainties within RICO jurisprudence. 98 Under Rule 11(b)(2),
an attorney incurs liability if he makes “legal contentions [that are
not] warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing
new law.” 99 For instance, the Supreme Court has determined that
the statute of limitations for a civil RICO claim will be four
years.100 Therefore, a plaintiff who argues that a ten-year-old
RICO claim is still actionable could be sanctioned under 11(b)(2)
as his argument would be frivolous in the face of clear Supreme
Court precedent. The concern with RICO is that there are many
areas where its requirements remain unclear, leaving courts to
wonder when plaintiffs are making “unwarranted” legal
arguments. Such areas include, but are not limited to, how RICO
claims toll and accrue, 101 how long racketeering activity must last
for it to become a “pattern” as required under Section 1962(c),102
and how a plaintiff can establish that the members of an alleged
RICO enterprise had a “common purpose” in conducting their
98. The Second Circuit has warned that the “[m]ere lack of clarity in the
general state of some areas of RICO law cannot shield every baseless RICO
claim from rule 11 [sic] sanctions.” O’Malley v. New York City Transit Auth.,
896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990). The court in O’Malley stated that “[o]nce a
[Rule 11] violation is shown to exist, the district court may not ignore the
command of [Rule 11]: ‘sanctions shall be imposed.’” Id. However, that
decision was superseded by the aforementioned 1993 Amendments to Rule
11. See Hoatson v. N.Y. Archdiocese, No. 05 Civ. 10467(PAC), 2007 WL
431098, at *9 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2007) (“The portion of O’Malley making
sanctions mandatory upon finding a violation of Rule 11 was overruled by the
1993 amendment to Rule 11, leaving the imposition of sanctions within the
district court’s discretion.”).
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
100. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S.
143, 156 (1987).
101. See generally, Carli McNeill, Seeing the Forest: A Holistic View of the
RICO Statute of Limitations, 85(3) NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1231 (2010)
(discussing the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding
accrual and tolling theory as applied to civil RICO’s four year statute of
limitations).
102. Contrast Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1293 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[T]his
court has faced the question of continued racketeering activity in several
cases, each time finding that conduct lasting no more than twelve months did
not meet the standard.”), with Cofacredit, S.A. v. Windsor Plumbing Supply
Co., Inc., 187 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]his Court has never held a
period of less than two years to constitute a ‘substantial period of time’ [for
RICO].”).
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crimes. 103 Given the numerous and varied interpretations of the
“common purpose” requirement, all of which have been argued
before and adopted by different courts, the following discussion
will focus on this area of discrepancy and how these divergent
views can confuse a court’s Rule 11(b)(2) determination.
An (Un)Common Purpose.
While the RICO statutes are silent as to any “common
purpose” requirement, 104 the Supreme Court has engrafted that
language onto the enterprise element. In 1981, the Court decided
United States v. Turkette and reiterated that the federal
government, in a RICO prosecution, must prove that the
defendants were all involved in a criminal enterprise. 105 The
Court further stated that this criminal enterprise does not have to
be a legal entity, but can merely constitute “a group of persons
associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course
of conduct.” 106 In doing so, the Court took a rare and, for many,
welcome step towards making RICO allegations more difficult to
103. A unique aspect of RICO violations is the requirement that a
plaintiff or prosecutor prove that the enterprise acted with a common purpose
when committing its crimes. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583
(1981). The majority of crimes committed in the United States are ones
which, by their definition, can be committed by one person. Over 71 percent
of the 13 million arrests reported in 2010 involved what might be referred to
as “solo crimes.” Excluded from those crimes were prostitution and gambling,
given that those crimes require at least two people. Also excluded was the
“all other crimes” category given the uncertainty regarding what crimes fall
into that group. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2010 UNIFORM CRIME
REPORT, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-inthe-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl29.xls (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). Certainly all of
these “solo crimes” are capable of being transformed into a group crime based
on the willingness of other parties; but it is difficult in many cases to
determine the exact reason why criminals collaborate to commit crime.
Fortunately for prosecutors in the average case, the reason why individuals
come together to commit crime is usually not relevant; however, in RICO
cases, the individual’s purpose for joining the criminal enterprise is not only
relevant—it must be proven as an element of the crime.
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
105. 452 U.S. at 580 (“[18 U.S.C. §] 1962(c) makes it unlawful ‘for any
person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.’”).
106. Id. at 583. (emphasis added).
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prove; however it also took a not-so-rare and, for many judges and
litigators, not-so-welcome step in making an already murky area
of law more opaque. Just how common does each participant’s
purpose have to be for the group to qualify as an enterprise?
The D.C. Circuit, where Feld’s complaint was filed, has been
fairly silent on this issue. Most recently, in United States v.
Richardson, the court merely affirmed the district court’s ruling
that the defendants’ alleged common purpose of “obtain[ing]
money or other property by robbery” was sufficient to sustain a
RICO conviction. 107 The court, however, refrained from any
further discussion regarding a specific common purpose standard
that it would apply in future cases. 108 This vacuum opens the
door for an array of “nonfrivolous” arguments regarding what the
applicable standard should be.
There are at least three available arguments regarding how
litigants may satisfy Turkette’s common purpose requirement.
The Second Circuit has taken the strictest view of the common
purpose requirement, mandating that “the individuals must share
a common purpose to engage in a particular fraudulent course of
conduct and work together to achieve such purposes.” 109 While
the Seventh Circuit eschews any requirement that the common
purpose be fraudulent, their standard is similarly high, requiring
that all of the parties to the enterprise have the exact same
purpose.110 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit has, by far, the most lax
common purpose jurisprudence. This circuit merely requires that
the parties to the alleged enterprise have “the same or similar
objective.” 111 The Eleventh Circuit has, in fact, gone so far to say
107. 167 F.3d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
108. Id. at 626.
109. First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 174
(2d. Cir. 2004) (“Plaintiffs have [ ] failed to allege . . . each participant’s role
in the alleged course of fraudulent or illegal conduct.”).
110. Baker v. IBP, Inc, 357 F.3d 685, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2004). In Baker,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ RICO allegations because, inter
alia, one defendant’s purpose for committing the crimes was to pay its
employees exceedingly low wages, while another’s purpose was to help the
first in an effort to be paid for its services, and yet a third defendant had the
purpose of assisting the first merely because they were members of the same
ethnic group. Id. Judge Easterbrook found these purposes to be fatally
“divergent” and, therefore, the group did not satisfy the common purpose
requirement. Id.
111. Williams v. Mohawk Industries, 465 F.3d 1277, 1285-86 (11th Cir.
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that the common purpose element may be satisfied if all of the
parties have the common goal of making money. 112
Contrasting the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation with the
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation makes abundantly clear just how
unclear this common purpose requirement is. Add the Second
Circuit’s “fraudulent” language and determining whether a
particular plaintiff’s common purpose argument is “warranted by
existing law” becomes a very difficult task. 113 As the common
purpose debate is but one of many areas within RICO
jurisprudence open to multiple interpretations, courts must find a
way to enhance their ability to distinguish between frivolous and
legitimate arguments.
Argument Identification and Candor with the Court.
One option to aid courts in determining whether a particular
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing the law is
frivolous, is mandatory “argument identification.” One circuit
court described the theory and function of argument identification
2006). In a case with facts more or less identical to those in Baker—employer
and other agencies partner together to hire and harbor illegal immigrants
intending to lower labor costs—the Eleventh Circuit, unlike the Seventh
Circuit, found that the common purpose element had been met. The
Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the Seventh’s common purpose formula
and stated:
In our circuit, however, there has never been any requirement that
the “common purpose” of the enterprise be the sole purpose of each
and every member of the enterprise. In fact, it may often be the case
that different members of a RICO enterprise will enjoy different
benefits from the commission of predicate acts. This fact, however,
is insufficient to defeat a civil RICO claim. Rather, all that is
required is a common purpose.
Id. at 1286.
112. United States v. Church, 955 F.2d 688, 698 (11th Cir. 1992). This
statement is remarkable given that financial gain presumably ranks fairly
high on the list of reasons why people commit crimes and, therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit has all but eliminated the common purpose requirement.
113. In the Feld litigation for example, there are three distinct groups of
defendants—the activists, the attorneys, and Tom Rider—each of whom had
a specific, arguably separate, purpose for joining the enterprise. The activist
groups joined for the fundraising boost, the attorneys joined for the legal fees,
and Rider joined for the bribe money. Under the Second and Seventh
Circuits’ narrow interpretations, these divergent purposes would likely not
suffice, however under the Eleventh Circuit’s lax approach the parties’
general goal of financial gain would be sufficient.
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as follows:
[T]he question is not whether the law exists, but whether
it pertains in the jurisdiction in which the law is being
asserted. Jurisdiction A might recognize the tort of “XYZ”
which Jurisdiction B does not. A lawyer in B could not in
good faith submit a complaint based on an XYZ cause of
action asserting that XYZ is the existing law merely
because XYZ is a legitimate cause of action in A. Instead,
the lawyer would be required to inform the court that she
recognized that XYZ was not yet a cognizable action in B
but that she believed that the law of B should be
extended, modified, or reversed to incorporate the tort of
XYZ. Only then would the lawyer have satisfied her
obligations under Rule 11. 114
Such argument identification would require Feld’s attorneys,
who would likely advocate for the Eleventh Circuit’s lax common
purpose standard, to inform the district court of the vacuum in
this area of the D.C. Circuit’s RICO jurisprudence. Also, it would
require them to explain reasons why, despite not being binding
authority, the court should adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s standard.
Similarly, the defendants’ attorneys, who would likely suggest the
Seventh Circuit’s strict common purpose standard be applied,
would be compelled to do the same. In this way, the D.C. District
Court would be fully apprised of the relevant law and, thus, be in
the best position to make an informed decision regarding which
standard would be adopted.
Mandatory argument identification was considered by the
Advisory Committee in the Spring of 1991 while the committee
drafted the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11. 115 The Spring 1991
draft of Rule 11 stated, in part, that a paper must be “warranted
by existing law or, if specifically identified as such, 116 by a
114. De Sisto College v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 766 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 952 (1990).
115.
William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 7, 31 (1994) [hereinafter Entering a New Era].
116. Id. Similar language had already been adopted in the Rule 11(b)(3)
and 11(b)(4) provisions which require that:
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials
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nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law.” 117 Prior to this draft version of Rule 11, the
circuits had been split as to whether argument identification was
required. 118 Ultimately, the argument identification clause of the
1991 draft was eliminated from the final version of the 1993
Amendments, but the committee notes to those amendments do
state that: “Although arguments for a change of law are not
required to be specifically so identified, a contention that is so
identified should be viewed with greater tolerance under [Rule
11].” 119
Unfortunately, these committee notes leave the issue of
argument identification up to the courts’ discretion. It would
seem prudent, however, in an area of law so saturated with the
“XYZ” jurisdictional differences mentioned at the start of this
discussion, that courts should lean towards requiring RICO
attorneys to be particularly forthcoming in contrasting those
arguments which are soundly supported by existing law from
those which are attempts to modify or extend existing law. Such a
requirement would alleviate many of the concerns belying a heavy
reliance on Rule 11(b)(2) as a regulator of RICO misuse.120
of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information.
117. Entering a New Era, supra note 115 (quoting GREGORY P. JOSEPH,
SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 204 (2d ed. 1994)).
118. Contrast Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d
1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that argument identification would create
“a conflict between a lawyer’s duty to zealously represent his client . . . and
the lawyer’s own interest in avoiding rebuke”) and Mary Ann Pensiero v.
Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[C]ounsel may not be found to have
violated Rule 11 merely for failing to ‘label’ the argument advanced.”), with
Maciosek v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 930 F.2d 536, 542 (7th Cir.
1991) (“[W]e reiterate that [plaintiff’s attorney’s] failure to discuss or
distinguish existing law warranted sanctions.”).
119. Entering a New Era, supra note 115 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11
advisory committee’s notes).
120. Moreover, Rule 3.3(a)(2) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
states that: “A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . (2) fail to disclose to the
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to
be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing
counsel.” However, as discussed supra in note 73, there are certain
shortcomings to the professional conduct rules’ functionality as a deterrent.
Moreover, Rule 3.3(a)(2) assumes the presence of directly adverse, binding
authority and does not contemplate such diverging, persuasive authorities
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C. Recommendation
Quite clearly, as the above discussion indicates, there are
certain limitations on Rule 11 as an effective deterrent to the
abuses set out in Part III. But, despite those limitations, Rule 11
retains one undeniable strength: vast discretionary breadth for
federal district courts. 121 Rule 11(c)(4) states that “[a] sanction
imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter
repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated.” 122 Moreover, district court decisions to grant
Rule 11 sanctions receive an exceeding amount of appellate
deference.123 Courts’ broad discretion to sanction offenders serves
that courts are frequently left to struggle with in many areas of RICO law.
121. In Crank v. Crank, one Texas district judge, in response to an
attorney’s violations of Rule 11(b)(2) and 11(b)(3), mandated the following:
[W]ithin 30 days of the date this memorandum opinion and order is
filed, [the offending attorney] shall submit to the defendants,
through their counsel of record, and to their counsel of record, letters
of apology for asserting claims that the court has held above are
sanctionable. The letters shall not contain qualifying or conditional
language.
No. CIV.A. 3:96-CV-1984-., 1998 WL 713273, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1998).
The district judge went even further to specify that phrases such as
“[b]ecause the court has required that I do so, I am apologizing” and
“[a]lthough I disagree with the court’s decision, I am apologizing” as the type
of “qualifying or conditional language” that would violate the order. Id. at *6
n.5.
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4). While the rule specifies no particular factors
for courts to take into account when fashioning a remedy, the Advisory
Committee Notes contemplate the following considerations:
Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it
was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event; whether it
infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense;
whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other
litigation; whether it was intended to injure; what effect it had on
the litigation process in time or expense; whether the responsible
person is trained in the law; what amount, given the financial
resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person
from repetition in the same case; what amount is needed to deter
similar activity by other litigants.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes.
123. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (“[A]n
appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all
aspects of a district court’s Rule 11 determination. A district court would
necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of
the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”).
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as an ideal balance to Congress and Supreme Court mandates for
broad construction of the RICO statute. For instance, if the D.C.
District Court in the Feld litigation decided to saddle Feld and
their attorneys with even a tenth of the treble damages that they
have requested 124—assuming that is what the federal court found
“sufficient to deter future violations”—one could imagine that
plaintiff’s attorneys across the country would take far more care in
evaluating the legitimacy of their client’s RICO claims before
filing suit. Such a sanction would send the message that, while
this country certainly needs litigants to penalize bona fide
organized criminal syndicates, fraudulent exploitation of that
need will be met with its own penalties.
The position advocated by this Comment is not that Rule 11
will completely thwart all RICO malfeasance, but rather that
when a district court is faced with a brazen misuse of RICO—as
this author would suggest the Feld litigation presents—the court
should utilize its expansive discretion in punishing the parties
(attorneys and clients alike) responsible. Some courts have
hesitated in using their broad Rule 11 discretion.125 That is
unfortunate. 126 One North Dakota district court, in denying a
124. Recall that, while not specified in the complaint, Feld’s treble
damages have been estimated at sixty million dollars.
125. “[A]ppellate courts have forcefully suggested that trial courts should
consider which sanction ‘constitutes the least severe sanction that will
adequately deter the undesirable conduct.’” Kirk Capital Corp. v. Bailey, 16
F.3d 1485, 1490 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Pope v. Federal Express, 974 F.2d
982, 985 (8th Cir. 1992)) (reducing the district court’s Rule 11 sanctions from
approximately $25,000 to less than $9,000).
126. There are certainly good arguments to be made supporting courts’
reticence in ordering Rule 11 sanctions, especially with regards to parties’
arguments for extending or reversing existing law. One such argument has
been articulated as follows:
The importance of permitting good faith arguments for outcomes
that are inconsistent with existing law cannot be understated. If
lawyers were not permitted to make such arguments, they could not
urge changes in the common law and could not ask courts to correct
erroneous or outdated precedents. The law would become frozen.
Because ethical standards encourage American lawyers to challenge
even recent precedents if they seem wrongly decided, courts,
including the Supreme Court, can correct their own mistakes
relatively quickly. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(statutes making it a crime for persons of the same sex to engage in
private sexual activity violated the due process clause), overruling
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (because it was incorrectly
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RICO defendant’s motion for Rule 11(b)(1) and 11(b)(2) sanctions,
commented that “both parties are big boys. They engaged in
protracted, and often contumacious litigation. Each side used
every arrow in their respective quiver.” 127 While the circuit court
admonished the district court for its “perfunctory generalized
response,” it ultimately affirmed the denial of Rule 11 sanctions
given the extreme level of deference afforded to lower courts in
such matters. 128 The district court’s rationale was shortsighted
and dangerous. Whether parties are experienced “big boys” or
their litigation is lengthy 129 should be irrelevant, as the injury
caused by RICO abuse is sustained by, not only the opposing
party, but also by the courts. Courts should, in defense of their
dockets and the legitimacy of the RICO statute, feel uninhibited, if
not compelled, to order Rule 11 sanctions—when the limitations
discussed above do not so preclude—against parties who misuse
this important statute.
CONCLUSION

RICO has been, and continues to be, an invaluable tool in this
country’s war against organized crime. But there is no doubt that
it is being abused.
Feld Entertainment has provided an
interesting and current example of how a legitimate fraud claim
can be trumped up into an illegitimate RICO claim for treble
damages. How can courts begin to counteract a sixty million
dollar incentive to misuse RICO without destroying the civil
decided).
LERMAN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 73, at 600 n.7. However, because
civil RICO litigation rarely, if ever, gives rise to weighty constitutional or
civil rights issues, such reticence to punish tenuous legal arguments is less
warranted. Moreover, since RICO remains, at its core, a statute aimed at
punishing criminal behavior there is certainly an interest in keeping the law
in that area stable to allow the citizenry to remain on notice as to what type
of behavior will constitute a violation.
127. Teamsters Nat’l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. ex rel. Teamsters
Local Union Nos. 116, 120, 123, 346, & 544 v. MME, Inc., 116 F.3d 1241,
1242 (8th Cir. 1997).
128. Id. (“[W]e afford the judgment of the district court great deference. . .
. [W]e [ ] find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Rule 11
sanctions.”).
129. One would imagine that litigation would be far less protracted—and
in many cases nonexistent—if parties refrained from inventing bases for
lawsuits.
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remedy for those who truly need it? The solution needs to be one
that both preserves the purpose and functionality of the remedy
for legitimate RICO claimants, while strongly discouraging frauds.
Reliance on Rule 11 is a logical starting point. By exercising the
broad discretion permitted under Rule 11, federal courts can and
should levy harsh sanctions against fraudulent RICO claimants.
Treble damages are a powerful carrot and, therefore, deterrence
will only be accomplished with an equally powerful stick.

